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I
Introduction
   I am grateful for the valuable comments made by an anonymous
reviewer.
1
 At the southern end of the Western Hemisphere the “new
regionalism” was inaugurated by the Argentine-Brazilian Trade and
Cooperation Programme signed in 1986 (a precursor to Mercosur).
At the northern end the first agreement was the United States-Canada
Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have mushroomed
in the Western Hemisphere since the mid-1980s. After
two decades of active negotiations, the final
architecture of this network of preferential trade pacts
is still in the making. The proliferation of PTAs in the
region is not entirely new, but the latest vintage of trade
discrimination differs in several ways from that of the
past and this has caused it to be labelled the “new
regionalism”.1
Whether convinced of its beneficial effects or of
its inevitability, many analysts have evaluated the “new
regionalism” benevolently, emphasizing the potential
advantages and minimizing the costs. Only a handful of
“free-traders” —usually accused of lacking “practical
sense”— have consistently raised a critical voice.
The objective of this paper is to examine the pros
and cons of the “new regionalism”, taking as a
landmark one of its most significant and complex
manifestations, the negotiations to establish a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The problems that
have emerged in relation to the architecture and
regulatory content of the FTAA are indicative of the
challenges and opportunities offered by the new
vintage of trade discrimination. A hemisphere-wide
preferential agreement may create trade opportunities
for the Latin American countries and foster economic
development throughout the continent, but this will not
come about automatically. The opportunities that may
be opened by the FTAA —like those stemming from any
process of economic liberalization— are conditional.
If they are to materialize, the agreement must meet
certain conditions and be accompanied by policies that
make it possible to reap the benefits of increased
competition, larger markets and deeper specialization.
Seen in this framework, the FTAA negotiations display
worrying trends.
This paper has five sections. Following the present
introductory section, section II summarizes the main
features of the “new regionalism” and reviews some
of the challenges and opportunities opened up by
North-South PTAs (a category that includes many of the
new vintage of such agreements). Section III underlines
the importance of domestic policies to complement
trade liberalization and the vital role these play when
it comes to actually reaping the opportunities offered
by the “new regionalism”, an aspect generally
overlooked in the debate about trade negotiations and
preferential trade agreements.
Section IV reviews the FTAA negotiations to date,
emphasizing recent trends and future prospects. Section
V, lastly, summarizes the main points raised in the paper,
with comprehension rather than prescription as its aim.
II
The “new regionalism” and North-South
preferential trade agreements in the
Western Hemisphere
decades has been a key ingredient of the so-called “new
regionalism”.2  This process has resulted in a complex
2
 The “new regionalism” is now worldwide. Even the Asia-Pacific
region, which had traditionally stood aside from discriminatory
practices, has joined the global trend, as suggested by the preferential
pacts signed by Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. For
an early analysis of the characteristics of the “new regionalism”,
see Bouzas and Ros (1994); see also IDB (2002) and Torrent (2002).
The wave of preferential trade negotiations that has
swept over the Western Hemisphere in the last two
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web of PTAs that Baghwati (1993) has likened to a
“spaghetti bowl”. Although at first sight, at least in
Latin America, it does not look very different from the
“old regionalism”, the “new regionalism” has been
accompanied by changes in both context and content.
The contextual changes include a more outward-
oriented policy environment (as a result of unilateral
and multilateral liberalization) and a renewed emphasis
on promoting closer integration into the world
economy (in contrast to the “autarchic” policies
prevalent in the past). The most significant changes in
content include broader coverage of issues and
disciplines (a “deeper” agenda) and the emergence of
North-South agreements binding together national
economies with large disparities in per capita income.
These new features may increase liberalization
commitments, but also friction between divergent
regimes and standards of treatment. In the “new
regionalism” the developed countries have also become
active contributors to the “spaghetti bowl”. The most
prominent case, because of its systemic role and its
decisive contribution to the creation of the post-war
multilateral trading regime, is that of the United States,
which after decades of championing multilateralism
has embraced discrimination as a complementary
policy.3
The “new regionalism” has certain advantages
over the PTAs of the past. Some of these have to do
with the new trade policy environment, such as the fact
that more outward-oriented trade policies have lowered
the welfare costs of trade diversion for members and
of negative discrimination for non-members. Others,
however, relate to the specific content of the “new
regionalism”. A number of analysts have pointed out
that North-South PTAs give smaller and less developed
economies preferential access to large high-income
markets. This benefit cannot be obtained through
unilateral liberalization and is shared with others when
liberalization is the result of multilateral bargaining.
Under some circumstances, preferential access to large
markets can be a powerful driving force for
developing-country exports. Similarly, the broader
coverage of disciplines typical of the “new
regionalism” may provide the developing-country
partner with more stable market access conditions. This
is particularly important because of the type of
protectionist instruments typically used in industrial
countries, such as “administrative protection”, sanitary
standards, etc. North-South agreements can also be a
vehicle for improving expectations, conferring greater
certainty upon the policy regime and attracting larger
flows of foreign investment into countries that usually
face severe balance-of-payments constraints (Ethier,
1998; World Bank, 2000). Moreover, some authors
point out that they can encourage (or even “force”)
developing countries to adopt institutions prevalent in
the developed partner, thus helping them to improve
economic performance.4
To deliver these results, which are not automatic,
North-South arrangements must respond adequately to
at least four challenges: ensuring effective reciprocity;5
helping to cope with adjustment and transition costs;
preventing the consolidation of polarization dynamics;
and ensuring that institutional spillovers have a positive
effect and can be effectively appropriated by the
developing partner. None of these can be taken for
granted, and they should thus be explicitly addressed
in any North-South agreement.
Although the issue of reciprocity is critical, the
historical evidence shows that it has not been easy to
enforce in the multilateral trading system, including the
Uruguay Round that ended in 1994. In fact, although
agriculture was included within the general disciplines
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the parties agreed to phase out quantitative
restrictions on trade in textiles and garments, the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and the implementation process
that followed have generated widespread dissatisfaction
in the developing world. There is now a growing
consensus that in some fields, such as the protection
of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of
trade-related investment disciplines, the developing
countries accepted commitments without being fully
aware of their impact and implications, making
reciprocity virtually impossible.
Taking into account the precedents at the
multilateral level, it may be worth asking what factors
may increase the likelihood of North-South preferential
pacts being negotiated in a more balanced way. As a
matter of fact, several structural features of the North-
3
 The European Community has had a tradition of activist
preferential trade policies towards developing countries, largely as
a result of the European colonial past.
4
 See Schiff and Winters (2003).
5
 Reciprocity is the policy whereby governments grant one another
concessions deemed equivalent in some way (for example, one of
them reduces tariff or other barriers to imports in exchange for the
trading partner making equivalent concessions in its export barriers).
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South variety of regional integration may work the
other way and hinder reciprocity. First, industrial
countries typically have well-established democratic
institutions that give citizens’ votes greater weight in
the domestic political process than is usually the case
in the developing world. Partly as a result, legislatures
in industrial democracies tend to play a more
substantive role in policy design and to be more
effective at transmitting private-sector interests
(collective or otherwise). This feature of the policy
process is reinforced by the fact that in the industrial
countries the private sector tends to be better organized
and to identify and promote its strategic interests more
effectively than in developing countries. In the latter
the private sector tends to organize more around
“defensive” issues that provide only a fragile basis for
the construction of an “offensive” bargaining agenda.
Non-business actors in industrial countries also tend to
have a more active and informed role in the policy-
making process, raising the likelihood that their views
and interests will be reflected in the final deal.
The chances of North-South preferential
negotiations leading to more reciprocal outcomes are
also negatively affected by the fact that some issues
which are very sensitive for a number of developing
countries are the outcome of the interplay of forces in
the global political economy. This being so, it is
unclear how preferential negotiations can make
substantial progress towards more balanced trade
agreements.6 Examples of these sensitive issues are
domestic subsidies for temperate agricultural products
and the implementation of “trade relief”, especially
antidumping duties. In effect, a cursory examination
of existing North-South preferential arrangements
confirms that these issues were left untouched by the
negotiators.
The likelihood that North-South preferential
arrangements will be based on reciprocity is also
shaped by the dynamics of the bargaining process
(outcomes are “path dependent”). Political economy
considerations suggest that one factor influencing
industrial countries’ choice of partners for negotiating
preferential trade arrangements is the minimization of
transition and adjustment costs (and hence of domestic
political opposition). In an asymmetrical context this
will increase the probability that the agreement will
reflect the priorities and sensitivities of the more
powerful partner. If an industrial country signs
successive agreements with one developing country at
a time, these are very unlikely to be based on
reciprocity. In addition to the effects of this bargaining
path on the regulatory content of successive
agreements, the “exclusion costs” for outsiders will
increase pari passu with the expansion of the
preferential network (either through a “minilateral”
arrangement or a “hub-and-spokes” system). In the
present context of uncertainty as to the evolution of the
multilateral trading regime, the resulting “defensive
incentives” may make the costs of non-participation
(even in a non-reciprocal deal) economically and
politically unbearable. The increase in perceived
“exclusion costs” may raise the price of the “entry
ticket”, reducing further the likelihood of reciprocal
and balanced agreements.7
North-South preferential trade agreements can be
a vehicle for improving expectations, providing policy
regimes with greater stability and attracting larger
inflows of foreign investment to developing countries.
They may also encourage a developing country to
upgrade its existing institutions and adopt some of
those commonly found in developed countries, thus
improving economic performance. But these benefits
are less automatic than is presumed by the more
enthusiastic proponents of North-South regionalism.
More stable policy regimes will be good only if the
underlying policies are sound and sustainable.
Moreover, although economic integration with a
developed country can trigger institutional
modernization, the “importation” of institutions is
rarely the best way to proceed, not least because the
efficacy of alternative institutional arrangements is
contingent on the environment in which they operate
(Lawrence, 1999). This is not to deny that institutional
effects may be positive, but to underline that much will
depend on the particular circumstances and on the
domestic environment and policies. Moreover, some
foreign institutions (or regimes) may simply run
6
 North-South PTAs (such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement or the free trade agreements between the European Union
and Mexico and Chile) have been carefully drafted to avoid touching
on issues that are very sensitive for the developed-country partner
(such as temperate agriculture in the case of the European Union).
Although this may be an acceptable bargain for some developing
countries, it may be extremely inefficient for others.
7
 These perverse dynamics are not taken into account by the
tautological argument often used to explain away the behaviour of
developing-country governments in respect of North-South
agreements, namely that “if they participate voluntarily, it must be
because they benefit”.
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counter to the economic or policy interests of the
developing-country partner.8
Transition and adjustment costs in the developing
country are a third key issue for North-South
regionalism. Like any liberalization process,
preferential liberalization will require the parties to
cope with these costs. When factor endowments differ
greatly between the partners, as is usually the case in
North-South agreements, the resulting specialization
pattern will be largely inter-industry. Consequently,
relative prices and factor payments will experience
comparatively large changes.9  These changes,
furthermore, will be bigger in the smaller partner.
Conventional trade theory treats this outcome as
evidence that most of the gains from trade liberalization
will accrue to the smaller economy. However, although
inter-industry specialization offers the potential for
large efficiency gains, these gains are conditional and
if they materialize they will do so only in the long term.
During the transition, national economies will need to
cope with the costs of adjustment.
This time-consistency challenge is a major political
economy problem, but one that receives relatively little
attention in conventional international trade theory. It is
also a major issue for policy makers in the real world.
The intense debates that took place in the United States
Congress when it was considering NAFTA (a treaty that
involved Canada, Mexico and the United States) and,
more recently, when it passed the Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) Act are illustrative of the attention that
the treatment of transition and adjustment costs
mobilizes in the case of industrial countries.10  These
issues are even more important for developing countries,
where adjustment costs are typically larger and where
less financial, political and institutional resources are
available to cope with their consequences. If this issue
is not addressed cooperatively, it may deepen existing
asymmetries by enabling the developed-country partner
to deal more effectively with its own adjustment costs
or even transfer some of the burden to the developing-
country partner.
Finally, market and policy failures can help
transmute adjustment and transition costs into
polarization dynamics and path divergence. North-
South preferential arrangements offer opportunities for
convergence in per capita income levels between rich
and poor countries, but they may also consolidate
vicious circles of stagnation and decay. As a matter of
fact, there is no theoretical reason why one trajectory
should predominate over the other. While some authors
emphasize the forces for convergence (World Bank,
2000), others underline the persistence of divergent
economic performances over time (this is the case with
cumulative causation models and endogenous growth
theories).11 In the latter case, “polarization effects”
could heighten existing inequalities and make
preferential trade agreements economically and/or
politically unsustainable, unless active public policies
are adopted.
In developing countries, failures in financial,
information and technology markets are frequent. In
addition, there are widespread policy failures due to the
relative fragility and newness of democratic institutions
and the weakness of their administrative capabilities.
In this context, the forces for convergence may be too
weak. With per capita income disparities much smaller
than those prevailing in the Western Hemisphere, the
European Union has made intensive use of structural
and regional funds to promote cohesion and counteract
the forces of polarization. The available evidence
suggests that apart from the contribution made by
financial transfers (which is debatable), the upgrading
of local institutions has played a key role.
In summary, the “new regionalism” has
advantages as compared to the typical PTAs of the past
(many of them related to the broader trade policy
environment), but it also faces new challenges that
make clear-cut conclusions about its superiority hard
to sustain. Many of the challenges and opportunities
typical of trade discrimination are magnified in North-
South agreements. This ambiguity lurks in the
background of most analyses, but its implications are
rarely developed in full. Under some circumstances the
“new regionalism” can bring tangible benefits for a
8
 Protection for intellectual property rights as originally established
by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement was problematic for many developing countries,
something that was officially acknowledged after much diplomatic
activism in the area of public health.
9
 Intra-industry or intrasectoral specialization is less resisted than
inter-industry specialization because it is usually accompanied by
less significant relative price changes. This, in turn, means more
modest changes in production factor payments and income
distribution.
10
 As well as defining precisely what trade negotiating objectives
should be pursued by the United States Administration, the TPA was
passed simultaneously with a package of financial resources to
provide social security benefits to workers left unemployed by higher
imports.
11
 See Bouzas (2003) for a discussion of the effects of structural
and policy asymmetries on economic integration.
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developing country (such as rapid manufacturing
export growth in the case of Mexico). However, the
nature and extent of these benefits will be contingent
on the content of the agreement, the bilateral agenda,
the structural characteristics of the partners and
domestic policies. These qualifications sound quite
obvious, but they have been downplayed in the past
and it is only recently, as evidence of the difficulties
has emerged, that they have begun to occupy a more
visible place in the public policy debate.
Going beyond the national focus, one should
emphasize that for outsiders the impact of the “new
regionalism” (especially North-South agreements) is
likely to be negative. The resulting “defensive
incentives” may distort policy decisions and make the
playing field even less level that it was before.
Evaluating the consequences of this process from a
“cosmopolitan” perspective —rather than a purely
national one— is a difficult task, but one that must be
attempted if the impact of the “new regionalism” is to
be properly assessed. Much of the inconclusive debate
about whether regionalism is a stepping-stone or a
stumbling-block for multilateralism bears on this issue,
which is not theoretical but empirical.
12
 See Bouzas and Keifman (2003) for a more detailed discussion.
III
The role of domestic policies
Preferential trade agreements, particularly North-South
ones, provoke strong reactions for and against. The
resulting debate generally assigns only secondary
importance to what is after all the key to reaping the
potential benefits of economic integration: domestic
policies. Trade liberalization (be it preferential,
multilateral or unilateral) may increase efficiency,
foster productivity growth and contribute to economic
development, but it is not a sufficient condition for
growth and development, as the simplistic policy
recommendations prevailing in the 1990s suggested.
Similarly, economic integration and North-South
preferential agreements may encourage growth and
development, but that will depend on the content of the
agreement and the accompanying domestic policies.
During the 1990s many Latin American and
Caribbean countries implemented ambitious trade
liberalization programmes, but most of them did not
experience any significant improvement in economic
performance, as measured either by real output or by
export growth.12 The potential benefits of trade
liberalization can be reaped only if this is accompanied
by the right domestic policies in the realm of the
macroeconomy, competitiveness and the compensation
of critical market failures. This equally holds true for
preferential liberalization.
The macroeconomic environment in which trade
liberalization takes place is critical to its sustainability
and final impact. In Latin America there is a long
tradition of trade liberalization programmes being
implemented pari passu with macroeconomic
stabilization processes built around the nominal
exchange rate as an anti-inflationary anchor. All of
them have led to appreciation of the domestic currency
in real terms and, eventually, to external crises and
policy reversals. These failures, occurring more than
once in some countries, have weakened the productive
fabric and reduced their ability to benefit from future
episodes of trade liberalization. It is unlikely,
furthermore, that economies subject to recurrent
external shocks and volatile capital flows will be able
to sustain successful trade liberalization policies over
time while simultaneously achieving an acceptable
growth performance.
In fact, countries will only manage an acceptable
economic performance if they pursue export-oriented
exchange-rate policies (preventing real appreciation of
the domestic currency for long periods of time),
implement prudent fiscal policies that avoid the build-
up of excessive public-sector debt, and adopt
mechanisms to offset unexpected shocks and
turbulence. This being so, a preferential trade
agreement which limits the scope for using policy
instruments that can lessen a country’s vulnerability to
external shocks (originating, for example, in the
financial markets) is unlikely to be the right recipe for
responsible macroeconomic management. Conversely,
one that includes compensatory mechanisms to deal
with unexpected external shocks may increase the
likelihood of more satisfactory macroeconomic
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outcomes. For example, there is a broad consensus that
the rapid and massive financial help provided by the
United States government to Mexico in 1994-1995
helped that country to leave the “peso crisis” behind
it faster than it would otherwise have done. NAFTA
probably had a favourable impact on investors’
expectations, helping Mexico to overcome the crisis
faster, but the financial package engineered by the
United States Administration was at least as important
at this time.
To bring about domestic conditions that will
enable them to benefit from economic integration and
trade liberalization, countries also need to implement
policies that foster competitiveness and compensate for
market failures. A more open trade regime is a
necessary condition for greater economic efficiency,
but other complementary policies that enable countries
to reap the gains of international specialization are
equally important. A competitiveness strategy of this
kind should be based on at least three pillars: i)
construction of adequate infrastructure; ii)
diversification of the production structure, and iii) the
development and strengthening of national innovation
systems.
The lack of adequate infrastructure is one of the
key factors holding back international trade. Many
goods are not traded simply because high transport
costs represent a major trade barrier. The relatively
high prices of services also diminish the incentive to
fragment the production process across countries,
limiting the scope for intrasectoral specialization.
Foreign aid could make a significant contribution to the
upgrading of trade-related infrastructure by focusing on
regional projects, or national projects with regional
externalities. In North-South agreements, the issue of
infrastructure development should be more easily and
effectively addressed than in South-South agreements
or unilateral or multilateral liberalization because one
of the parties is usually well equipped with financial
resources and administrative expertise that can be used
for this purpose. The example of infrastructure
spending in the European Union, where per capita
income disparities are much smaller than in the
Western Hemisphere, should encourage a more
effective focus on this issue.
Export promotion policies can help to diversify
production. Active trade diplomacy that opens up
foreign markets, identifies new opportunities and
disseminates information may help to increase exports.
But to be effective these policies need a well trained
bureaucracy and public-sector officials capable of
developing a cooperative —but independent—
relationship with the private sector. This suggests that
there is a very significant role for export promotion
policies focused on the provision of information,
foreign trade support, financial assistance and
insurance guarantees. Many of these instruments and
institutions are already in place in a number of Latin
American countries, but their efficacy is low. However,
there are exceptions which confirm that their
contribution really can be significant. Rather than
conventional export subsidies (for the most part limited
by multilateral commitments), a modern view of export
promotion demands an emphasis on the efficient
provision of information, coordination and other public
goods.
Considering the failures that prevail in
technology, credit and human capital markets, policies
to increase productivity are the best recipe for better
export performance in the long run. Although the
Uruguay Round agreements prohibited non-agricultural
export subsidies, they gave the green light to other
domestic aids widely used by the industrial countries
(such as subsidies for research and development).
There are three aspects that are critical if the gap
between industrial and developing countries as regards
the type and extent of public-sector aids is to be closed
(ECLAC, 2002). In the first place, policies should foster
forward and backward linkages as a mechanism for
rectifying a dualistic economic structure in which
modern activities that are closely integrated into the
world economy operate side by side with backward and
low-productivity sectors. In this area, domestic public
policies can help by providing infrastructure and
coordination geared towards the strengthening of
production clusters. Secondly, there must be official
agencies in a position to help local firms (especially
small and medium-sized ones) with technology
diffusion, innovation and human resource
development. Public policies should focus on providing
a solid scientific and technological infrastructure,
stimulating research and development and coordinating
innovation activities undertaken by universities,
research institutions and firms. Lastly, since research
and development spending is about five times higher
as a proportion of real output in the industrial countries
than in developing ones, governments in the latter
should consider granting research and development
subsidies to the private sector.
None of these policies is guaranteed to succeed,
particularly given the institutional fragility and
weakness that prevail in Latin America. Even so, it is
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essential to undertake appropriate initiatives in each of
these fields, if the objective is to reap the potential
benefits of trade liberalization and economic
integration. As the experience of Mexico after a decade
in NAFTA demonstrates, despite rapid export growth to
the United States market and the change in export
composition, the lack of effective domestic policies in
these critical areas has perpetuated a dual economy in
which personal and regional income disparities have
widened instead of contracting.
13
 A few weeks prior to this meeting, the United States
Administration was inclined to exclude any specific trade
commitments from the final declaration. Several governments in
the region mobilized to change this decision, arguing that the failure
to make an explicit commitment on trade would reduce the relevance
of the Summit For an analysis of the early years of negotiations,
see Bouzas and Svarzman (2001); see also Feinberg (1997).
IV
Ten years after Miami, where are FTAA
negotiations heading?
When the FTAA process was launched in 1994 it was
received with a mixture of enthusiasm and scepticism.
Both reactions were justified. Some governments
regarded it as a way of restoring trade and investment
incentives eroded by the preferences granted to
Mexico, while others which did not see such obvious
trade and investment incentives regarded it as an
insurance policy that would guarantee stable access to
a large market and as a mechanism to lock in economic
reforms and improve expectations. Some governments
saw the FTAA as an opportunity to strengthen
hemispheric relations and make United States
engagement in the region more explicit. These
enthusiastic views account for the support that gathered
around the initiative in many Latin American
governments and the intense diplomatic efforts that
many of them made to include trade issues on the
agenda of the First Summit of the Americas, the
presidential meeting held in Miami in December
1994.13
But the sceptics also had a point. Divergent
agendas, interests and perceptions, asymmetries of
development and size and the credibility problem faced
by United States negotiators (lacking a Congressional
mandate to negotiate trade agreements on a fast track
basis) offered good reasons for pessimism. Despite
these reservations, the more reluctant governments had
little option but to follow the predominant trend.
Consequently, they focused their efforts on strategies
to block or delay the negotiations. This was made
easier for some time by the credibility deficit of the
United States negotiators, but as time passed even the
most reluctant parties started to prepare for substantive
negotiations by organizing their public sectors and
promoting closer cooperation between private and
public actors.14
During the first three years of negotiations the
participant governments gathered information, got to
know each other and laid down the strategic principles
that would guide the negotiations. Only at the Fourth
Ministerial Meeting held in San Jose, Costa Rica in
1998 did the trade ministers announce the key
principles and define the structure within which the
negotiations would be carried on.15 However, the set
of principles agreed at that time left several issues
unresolved, enabling the parties to interpret
commitments in different ways.16 The presidential
meeting (Second Summit of the Americas) held in
14
 The Brazilian Government, one of the most reluctant participants
in the FTAA process, was at the same time one of the most active in
creating the domestic conditions it needed to negotiate effectively.
See Da Motta Veiga (2002) for an analysis.
15
 The main principles agreed were: i) consensus decision-making;
ii) the agreement of a single package of rights and obligations valid
equally for all signatories (“single undertaking”); iii) individual or
group participation in the negotiations; iv) WTO-consistency; v) no
a priori exclusions in market access negotiations; vi) the coexistence
of the FTAA process with subregional integration processes; vii) equal
rights and obligations, taking into consideration differences in size
and development levels, and viii) the launching of effective
negotiations in 1998 and conclusion by 2004 at the latest. At the
San Jose meeting the parties agreed on the structure of the
negotiations: there would be nine Negotiating Groups overseen by
a Trade Negotiations Committee formed of deputy trade ministers.
The Committee would meet at least once every 18 months.
16
 One example of the ambiguity of some of the principles agreed
on at San Jose was the coexistence of the “single undertaking” and
“early harvest” principles.
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Santiago, Chile in 1998 ratified the agreements reached
in San Jose and formally launched the negotiations.
After Santiago the FTAA negotiations moved on to
the next phase, with a more specific agenda that
included mandates for each Negotiating Group and the
specific procedures and modalities to be adopted in
each forum. The parties agreed to write a unified draft
text and submit it to the Sixth Meeting of Ministers of
Trade scheduled to take place in Buenos Aires in April
2001. At that meeting the trade ministers examined a
long “bracketed” text that consolidated the results
achieved —or lack of them— in each of the nine
Negotiating Groups. Much of the text simply reported
divergent national positions.
The Seventh Meeting of Ministers of Trade took
place in Quito in November 2002 and made modest
progress with respect to the Buenos Aires meeting. In
Quito a second draft text was submitted to the
ministers, the Committee on Institutional Affairs began
to operate and negotiating methods and procedures for
the next phase were agreed upon (including the
procedures for notifying base tariffs), as was a
timetable for exchanging market access offers (starting
on 15 December 2002). For all the apparent progress,
in many chapters of the draft text only a few brackets,
relating to formal aspects, were removed. Wherever
text had been bracketed because of substantive
differences of opinion, it remained so now.
The Quito Meeting of Ministers of Trade also
raised doubts about the feasibility of the timetable,
particularly when it came to the submission of market
access offers. In fact, in five of the groups (agriculture,
market access, government procurement, services and
investment) market access negotiations were launched
and a timetable for exchanging offers was set before
critical differences over the methods and procedures
to be adopted by each negotiating group had been
bridged. The architecture of the services chapter and
its relationship with the investment chapter, for
example, were left unresolved.17 There was also
disagreement over how tariff concessions should be
submitted in the goods chapter.18 The operational
content of the special and differential treatment
principle was also a matter of controversy.19
The offers submitted since December 2002 reflect
these ambiguities. In the goods and services chapters
practically all countries had submitted offers by the
target date (15 February 2003), but this was not the
case with the investment and government procurement
chapters. The groups of countries that submitted joint
offers (Mercosur, the Andean Community and the
Central American Common Market) did so with
different formats, coverage and architectures,
illustrating the difficulty of finding a common
approach. The United States, meanwhile, submitted
four different market access offers depending on the
group of countries concerned. All other participants
made a single offer, indicating the possibility of some
type of special treatment for small economies. Services
and investment offers were also made, following
different architectural approaches.
In summary, just prior to the Eighth Meeting of
Ministers of Trade, held in Miami in November 2003,
the FTAA negotiations faced a large number of
unresolved issues. The lack of offers from Argentina
and Brazil in certain areas such as government
procurement, services and investment reflected a
growing preoccupation with the overall balance of the
negotiations. In effect, the United States refusal to deal
with certain issues at the hemispheric level (such as
antidumping and agricultural subsidies), either because
they were regarded as inappropriate for preferential
treatment or systemic in nature, encouraged a response
that consisted in the withdrawal from the FTAA agenda
of issues considered to be of “offensive” interest to that
country (precisely investment, services and government
procurement).20 Consequently, in mid-2003 Mercosur
formally submitted a proposal to continue negotiations
along three parallel tracks: a bilateral track in the “4+1
17
 It was left undecided, for example, whether offers in the services
sector would be made following the criteria of negative or positive
lists or whether offers on services-related foreign direct investment
would be included in the investment or services chapter (the
“commercial presence” modality, in the jargon of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services). For a detailed discussion, see:
http://www.ub.es/obsglob/Seriemercosur-.html.
18
 It was left undecided whether the presentation of market access
offers in goods sectors would be made on the basis of the regional
most-favoured nation principle or would include differing treatment
by country or group of countries. See: http://www.ub.es/obsglob/
Semercosur-.html.
19
 The Quito ministerial declaration reaffirmed some conditions for
progress in the negotiations which made explicit the concerns
prevalent among the participants. Major concerns were the need to
make “continuous, balanced and substantial progress on all
negotiating issues”, to take into consideration differences in
development level and size, and to link the FTAA negotiations to the
progress made in the Doha round.
20
 Concerning the potential of the FTAA as a trigger for policy change
in areas considered sensitive by the United States, it is telling that
the Western Hemisphere countries which have not yet started
bilateral preferential negotiations with the United States accounted
in 2001 for slightly more than 6% of United States exports, as
compared to 44.3% for the hemisphere as a whole.
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format” (Mercosur member States and the United
States), an FTAA track and a multilateral track. Each
track would cover a different range of issues and the
FTAA agenda would be considerably less ambitious than
initially conceived.21
The reduction in the breadth and scope of the FTAA
was complementary to another trend firmly established
in recent years, namely the creeping “bilateralization”
of the negotiating process. Since 1994 a multi-layered
process of bilateral and “minilateral” negotiations, with
access to the United States market a key consideration,
has developed simultaneously with and in parallel to
the FTAA process. As part of this process, and after a
long delay, the United States Administration signed a
free trade agreement with Chile and concluded
negotiations with the members of the Central American
Common Market. Negotiations were also launched
with the Dominican Republic, Peru, Colombia,
Ecuador and Bolivia. From the standpoint of United
States interests, these sequential negotiations have
aimed at gradually consolidating an agenda and an
architecture consistent with broader United States
negotiating objectives. The strategy has not been
limited to the United States, though. Mercosur
attempted with much less success to establish a free
trade area in South America, while Mexico and Chile
have succeeded in consolidating their role as hubs in
the “hub and spokes” system under construction.
The Miami Meeting of Ministers of Trade did not
clear up existing doubts about the prospects of the FTAA
process, and indeed raised new ones. The summit was
not an open failure, but it replicated a standard feature
of FTAA negotiations: postponement of the most
sensitive issues, even though the date set for
concluding the negotiations was only 12 months ahead.
In practice, the Miami meeting formalized what was
already a fact, namely that the FTAA, if eventually
agreed, will be considerably less ambitious than
originally envisioned. This “light” version of the FTAA
may serve the needs of several of the key parties, even
if some of them formally oppose that architecture.
The Miami compromise22 —drafted by United
States and Brazilian negotiators— gave rise to a two-
layered agreement. The first layer includes “a common
and balanced set of rights and obligations applicable
to all signatories”, while the second layer includes
“additional benefits and obligations” for those countries
or groups of countries willing to negotiate deeper
market access commitments or stricter disciplines. The
first and common layer would include rights and
obligations in the nine areas under negotiation, with no
exclusions. However, in the absence of an agreement
to develop specific (and deeper) rules on all these
issues, the resulting agreements may simply replicate
the commitments already made at WTO. In that event,
the WTO-plus nature of the FTAA process would be
seriously open to question. The Ministerial Declaration
also failed to go into any detail about the content of
the general agreement, since the parties failed to reach
consensus (a situation which remains unchanged as of
late 2004).
The Ministerial Declaration did not clarify the
relationship between the hemispheric agreement and the
bilateral or plurilateral agreements either. One alternative
could be to adopt an architecture similar to that of the
pre-Uruguay Round GATT, whereby a multilateral
agreement with rights and obligations for all signatories
coexisted with voluntary codes of conduct. Another
alternative could be a multilateral umbrella giving
coverage to the existing network of bilateral and
minilateral agreements. In this latter case the FTAA would
resemble the architecture of the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA), with the major novelty
of having the United States and Canada inside.21
 See: http://www.ub.es/obsglob/Semercosur-.html. On that same
occasion 13 countries (12 from Latin America plus Canada)
submitted a document urging that an ambitious agenda be retained.
Uruguay also presented a text that sought to reconcile the “original
approach” with some degree of flexibility to accommodate national
specificities.
22
 Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2003 (Free Trade Area
of the Americas, Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Trade, Miami).
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V
Conclusions
Although the negotiations have not concluded yet, the
FTAA process demonstrates how difficult it is to
negotiate reciprocal North-South preferential trade
agreements. Indeed, the FTAA that is starting to emerge
after a decade of negotiations is very problematic. The
best guarantee of a more balanced and reciprocal
agreement would have been to stick to negotiations
undertaken within a “plurilateral” framework (the
original spirit of the “single undertaking” concept). The
asymmetries of the negotiating process, however,
pushed it irreversibly in another direction.
After a decade of negotiations, the scenario of a
balanced and comprehensive FTAA that offers an
acceptable bargain to all the parties involved seems to
be out of reach. This has been due to the nature of the
agenda and the differences over how to deal with it (a
number of parties have shown a limited interest in a
comprehensive agreement). The interdependence
between some of the issues under negotiation and the
multilateral situation has made it unlikely that the former
can move faster than the latter, unless a biased agenda
prevails. In this context, as the United States Trade
Representative stated after the failure of the WTO 2003
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, the United States is
ready to move forward with its strategy of “competitive
liberalization”, reaching deals with partners that are
ready for this. This scenario deepens the asymmetrical
nature of hemispheric trade negotiations and reduces the
likelihood of truly reciprocal trade agreements.
The most likely scenario for the FTAA is an
agreement of limited coverage, along the lines of the
“two-layered” architecture agreed in Miami. Given the
difficulty of coming to terms on what should be
included in the “umbrella” agreement, however, there
is a very high chance that this will end up as an “ultra-
light” set of general principles. Such an agreement,
however, may suit the interests of a larger number of
partners than initially imagined.
Indeed, an “ultra-light” agreement would not run
counter to the United States trade policy strategy of
pursuing its trade agenda by the bilateral route. United
States negotiators can continue to pick up those
partners that offer the least resistance to their demands
and whose own demands conflict least with the United
States domestic political economy. This would enable
them to continue promoting their trade objectives at a
relatively low domestic political cost. For countries that
have become hemispheric hubs, an “ultra-light”
agreement may be a reasonable compromise to prolong
the benefits of positive discrimination. In turn, the most
reluctant partners (such as Brazil) may find that this
scenario offers a way of putting off the tough choices
implicit in a North-South agreement. This, however,
must be weighed against the consequences of negative
discrimination in Western Hemisphere markets and the
resulting increase in the costs of exclusion. Over the
medium term, this can hardly be regarded as an
acceptable alternative unless the Doha Development
Round makes unexpectedly substantial progress.
The complex trade architecture that will emerge
in the Western Hemisphere is likely to exacerbate the
mercantilist bias implicit in trade negotiations, making
what is already a structurally asymmetrical playing
field even less level. Considering the fragility of the
disciplines governing preferential trade agreements at
WTO, the prospects for North-South regionalism and its
complementarity with the multilateral trading regime
cannot but raise serious concerns.
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